TY - GEN
T1 - A threat for tablet PCs in public space
T2 - 21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2014
AU - Hayashi, Yuichi
AU - Homma, Naofumi
AU - Miura, Mamoru
AU - Aoki, Takafumi
AU - Sone, Hideaki
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2014 ACM.
PY - 2014/11/3
Y1 - 2014/11/3
N2 - The use of tablet PCs is spreading rapidly, and accordingly users browsing and inputting personal information in public spaces can often be seen by third parties. Unlike conventional mobile phones and notebook PCs equipped with distinct input devices (e.g., keyboards), tablet PCs have touchscreen keyboards for data input. Such integration of display and input device increases the potential for harm when the display is captured by malicious attackers. This paper presents the description of reconstructing tablet PC displays via measurement of electromagnetic (EM) emanation. In conventional studies, such EM display capture has been achieved by using non-portable setups. Those studies also assumed that a large amount of time was available in advance of capture to obtain the electrical parameters of the target display. In contrast, this paper demonstrates that such EM display capture is feasible in real time by a setup that fits in an attaché case. The screen image reconstruction is achieved by performing a prior course profiling and a complemental signal processing instead of the conventional fine parameter tuning. Such complemental processing can eliminate the differences of leakage parameters among individuals and therefore correct the distortions of images. The attack distance, 2 m, makes this method a practical threat to general tablet PCs in public places. This paper discusses possible attack scenarios based on the setup described above. In addition, we describe a mechanism of EM emanation from tablet PCs and a countermeasure against such EM display capture.
AB - The use of tablet PCs is spreading rapidly, and accordingly users browsing and inputting personal information in public spaces can often be seen by third parties. Unlike conventional mobile phones and notebook PCs equipped with distinct input devices (e.g., keyboards), tablet PCs have touchscreen keyboards for data input. Such integration of display and input device increases the potential for harm when the display is captured by malicious attackers. This paper presents the description of reconstructing tablet PC displays via measurement of electromagnetic (EM) emanation. In conventional studies, such EM display capture has been achieved by using non-portable setups. Those studies also assumed that a large amount of time was available in advance of capture to obtain the electrical parameters of the target display. In contrast, this paper demonstrates that such EM display capture is feasible in real time by a setup that fits in an attaché case. The screen image reconstruction is achieved by performing a prior course profiling and a complemental signal processing instead of the conventional fine parameter tuning. Such complemental processing can eliminate the differences of leakage parameters among individuals and therefore correct the distortions of images. The attack distance, 2 m, makes this method a practical threat to general tablet PCs in public places. This paper discusses possible attack scenarios based on the setup described above. In addition, we describe a mechanism of EM emanation from tablet PCs and a countermeasure against such EM display capture.
KW - EM information leakage
KW - Remote screen-image visualization
KW - Tablet PCs
KW - Touch-screen devices
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84910612681&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84910612681&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/2660267.2660292
DO - 10.1145/2660267.2660292
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84910612681
SN - 9781450329576
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 954
EP - 965
BT - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
Y2 - 3 November 2014 through 7 November 2014
ER -