TY - JOUR
T1 - Advanced analysis of faults injected through conducted intentional electromagnetic interferences
AU - Sauvage, Laurent
AU - Danger, Jean Luc
AU - Guilley, Sylvain
AU - Homma, Naofumi
AU - Hayashi, Yu Ichi
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - Experimental setups used in electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) tests can be used as platforms for fault injections. Injecting faults into equipment is a means for a malevolent attacker to extract secret information. In this paper, we first present an advanced setup, i.e., a setup with characteristics beyond the main international EMC standards. It performs more accurate measurements of the disturbance power, reducing the measurement error by 20.33 dB. Second, we propose an advanced analysis methodology allowing an attacker or a countermeasure designer to identify the disturbance frequency leading to the most powerful attack. As an illustration, the method is applied on an ASIC implementation of DES, providing a thorough characterization and classification of the generated faults. In this case, the most powerful attacks are performed when the disturbance has a frequency below 1 MHz. The threat has thus to be considered really serious, as generating such disturbance does not require a high budget.
AB - Experimental setups used in electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) tests can be used as platforms for fault injections. Injecting faults into equipment is a means for a malevolent attacker to extract secret information. In this paper, we first present an advanced setup, i.e., a setup with characteristics beyond the main international EMC standards. It performs more accurate measurements of the disturbance power, reducing the measurement error by 20.33 dB. Second, we propose an advanced analysis methodology allowing an attacker or a countermeasure designer to identify the disturbance frequency leading to the most powerful attack. As an illustration, the method is applied on an ASIC implementation of DES, providing a thorough characterization and classification of the generated faults. In this case, the most powerful attacks are performed when the disturbance has a frequency below 1 MHz. The threat has thus to be considered really serious, as generating such disturbance does not require a high budget.
KW - Conducted disturbances
KW - electromagnetic compatibility
KW - fault injection attack
KW - information leakage
KW - intentional electromagnetic interferences
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U2 - 10.1109/TEMC.2013.2254715
DO - 10.1109/TEMC.2013.2254715
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84879413886
SN - 0018-9375
VL - 55
SP - 589
EP - 596
JO - IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility
JF - IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility
IS - 3
M1 - 6517267
ER -