Analysis of electromagnetic information leakage from cryptographic devices with different physical structures

Yu-Ichi Hayashi, Naofumi Homma, Takaaki Mizuki, Takafumi Aoki, Hideaki Sone, Laurent Sauvage, Jean Luc Danger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

56 Citations (Scopus)


This paper presents a novel analysis of electromagnetic (EM) information leakage from cryptographic devices, based on the electromagnetic interference (EMI) theory. In recent years, side-channel attack using side-channel information (e.g., power consumption and EM radiation) is of major concern for designers of cryptographic devices. However, few studies have been conducted to investigate how EM information leakage changes according to device's physical parameters. In this paper, we introduce a cryptographic device model to analyze EM information leakage based on the EMI theory in a systematic manner. This device model makes it possible to acquire the frequency characteristics of EM radiation depending on physical parameters, such as board size and power-line length, accurately. The analysis results show that EM information leakage can be explained by the major EMI parameters such as board size and cable length attached to the board. In addition, we demonstrate that the intensity of EM information leakage from a generic device is also explained by board size and cable length.

Original languageEnglish
Article number6387591
Pages (from-to)571-580
Number of pages10
JournalIEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2013


  • Cryptographic devices
  • electromagnetic information leakage
  • electromagnetic interference (EMI)
  • signal analysis
  • system security

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics
  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering


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