Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods

Shinji Ohseto

doi:10.1007/s00199-005-0014-1

Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods

Shinji Ohseto

EEF - Economics and Management

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

37 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods when monetary compensations are possible. First, we characterize the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Second, we identify the Pareto undominated subset in the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. These characterizations can be interpreted as envy-free selections of Groves mechanisms.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	111-121
Number of pages	11
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	29
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0014-1
Publication status	Published - 2006 Sept 1

Keywords

Envy-freeness
Groves mechanisms
Indivisible goods
Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s00199-005-0014-1

Cite this

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abstract = "We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods when monetary compensations are possible. First, we characterize the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Second, we identify the Pareto undominated subset in the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. These characterizations can be interpreted as envy-free selections of Groves mechanisms.",

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AB - We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods when monetary compensations are possible. First, we characterize the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Second, we identify the Pareto undominated subset in the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. These characterizations can be interpreted as envy-free selections of Groves mechanisms.

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KW - Strategy-proofness

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Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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