Comparative statics of assignment markets with general utilities

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6 Citations (Scopus)


This note considers entry and exit problems of an agent in assignment markets without the quasi-linear utility assumption. We generalize Mo's (1988) strong dominance theorem to this class of environment. For example, if a seller enters the market and he is active in some equilibrium of the new market then there exists a non-empty subset of objects of which competitive prices are decreased whatever equilibria of old and new markets are selected.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)519-531
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Issue number6
Publication statusPublished - 1994 Nov


  • Assignment market
  • Competitive equilibrium
  • Strong dominance theorem


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