TY - JOUR
T1 - Comparative statics of assignment markets with general utilities
AU - Miyake, Mitsunobu
N1 - Funding Information:
* I wish to thank Ko Nishihara and Ed Green for helpful comments, This research is supported in part by the Ministry of Education, Japan.
PY - 1994/11
Y1 - 1994/11
N2 - This note considers entry and exit problems of an agent in assignment markets without the quasi-linear utility assumption. We generalize Mo's (1988) strong dominance theorem to this class of environment. For example, if a seller enters the market and he is active in some equilibrium of the new market then there exists a non-empty subset of objects of which competitive prices are decreased whatever equilibria of old and new markets are selected.
AB - This note considers entry and exit problems of an agent in assignment markets without the quasi-linear utility assumption. We generalize Mo's (1988) strong dominance theorem to this class of environment. For example, if a seller enters the market and he is active in some equilibrium of the new market then there exists a non-empty subset of objects of which competitive prices are decreased whatever equilibria of old and new markets are selected.
KW - Assignment market
KW - Competitive equilibrium
KW - Strong dominance theorem
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0013546767&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0013546767&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/0304-4068(94)90010-8
DO - 10.1016/0304-4068(94)90010-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0013546767
SN - 0304-4068
VL - 23
SP - 519
EP - 531
JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics
JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics
IS - 6
ER -