Evaluation of information leakage from cryptographic hardware via common-mode current

Yu Ichi Hayashi, Naofumi Homma, Takaaki Mizuki, Takeshi Sugawara, Yoshiki Kayano, Takafumi Aoki, Shigeki Minegishi, Akashi Satoh, Hideaki Sone, Hiroshi Inoue

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)


This paper presents a possibility of Electromagnetic (EM) analysis against cryptographic modules outside their security boundaries. The mechanism behind the information leakage is explained from the view point of Electromagnetic Compatibility: electric fluctuation released from cryptographic modules can conduct to peripheral circuits based on ground bounce, resulting in radiation. We demonstrate the consequence of the mechanism through experiments where the ISO/IEC standard block cipher AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) is implemented on an FPGA board and EM radiations from power and communication cables are measured. Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis (CEMA) is conducted in order to evaluate the information leakage. The experimental results show that secret keys are revealed even though there are various disturbing factors such as voltage regulators and AC/DC converters between the target module and the measurement points. We also discuss information-suppression techniques as electrical-level countermeasures against such CEMAs.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1089-1097
Number of pages9
JournalIEICE Transactions on Electronics
Issue number6
Publication statusPublished - 2012 Jun


  • Common-mode currents
  • Cryptographic modules
  • Electromagnetic information leakage
  • Information security
  • Side-channel attacks


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