TY - JOUR
T1 - Evolutionary dynamics in multitasking environments
AU - Sawa, Ryoji
AU - Zusai, Dai
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors would like to express our appreciation to the Associate Editor, three anonymous reviewers, and the participants of the Stony Brook Game Theory Conference and Hausdorff Trimester Program workshop for their helpful comments. Sawa acknowledges the financial support from JSPS Grants-in-Aid 15K17023 and 18K12740. Zusai is grateful to the University of Aizu, University of Tsukuba, and Hitotsubashi University for their support and hospitality during the visits that were part of this work.
Funding Information:
The authors would like to express our appreciation to the Associate Editor, three anonymous reviewers, and the participants of the Stony Brook Game Theory Conference and Hausdorff Trimester Program workshop for their helpful comments. Sawa acknowledges the financial support from JSPS Grants-in-Aid 15K17023 and 18K12740 . Zusai is grateful to the University of Aizu, University of Tsukuba, and Hitotsubashi University for their support and hospitality during the visits that were part of this work.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2019/10
Y1 - 2019/10
N2 - We formulate the best response dynamic in a multitasking environment; while agents engage in multiple games concurrently, an agent can switch her action in only one of the games upon receipt of a revision opportunity. The choice of the game in which to revise an action makes the multitasking dynamic behave differently from standard evolutionary dynamics. The timing of revisions in a game becomes endogenous, which causes the transition of the action distribution in each game to depend on those in other games. Despite such complexity, we verify the global stability of the Nash equilibrium set in potential and contractive games as well as the local stability of a regular evolutionary stable state. We also show that the equilibrium to which the multitasking dynamic converges may depend on the task choice rules.
AB - We formulate the best response dynamic in a multitasking environment; while agents engage in multiple games concurrently, an agent can switch her action in only one of the games upon receipt of a revision opportunity. The choice of the game in which to revise an action makes the multitasking dynamic behave differently from standard evolutionary dynamics. The timing of revisions in a game becomes endogenous, which causes the transition of the action distribution in each game to depend on those in other games. Despite such complexity, we verify the global stability of the Nash equilibrium set in potential and contractive games as well as the local stability of a regular evolutionary stable state. We also show that the equilibrium to which the multitasking dynamic converges may depend on the task choice rules.
KW - Best response dynamics
KW - Bounded rationality
KW - Evolution
KW - Evolutionary stable state
KW - Multitasking
KW - Stability of the Nash equilibrium
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85071107537&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85071107537&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.021
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.021
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85071107537
SN - 0167-2681
VL - 166
SP - 288
EP - 308
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
ER -