Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels

Ryoji Sawa; Dai Zusai

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.001

Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels

Ryoji Sawa, Dai Zusai

ECON - Economics and Management

The University of Aizu

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider deterministic evolutionary dynamics under imitative revision protocols. We allow agents to have different aspiration levels in the imitative protocols where their aspiration levels are not observable to other agents. We show that the distribution of strategies becomes statistically independent of the aspiration level eventually in the long run. Thus, long-run properties of homogeneous imitative dynamics hold as well, despite heterogeneity in aspiration levels.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	562-577
Number of pages	16
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	154
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.001
Publication status	Published - 2014 Nov 1

Keywords

Aspiration level
Imitation
Learning
Multiple populations
Wright manifold

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10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.001

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title = "Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels",

abstract = "We consider deterministic evolutionary dynamics under imitative revision protocols. We allow agents to have different aspiration levels in the imitative protocols where their aspiration levels are not observable to other agents. We show that the distribution of strategies becomes statistically independent of the aspiration level eventually in the long run. Thus, long-run properties of homogeneous imitative dynamics hold as well, despite heterogeneity in aspiration levels.",

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author = "Ryoji Sawa and Dai Zusai",

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AU - Zusai, Dai

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AB - We consider deterministic evolutionary dynamics under imitative revision protocols. We allow agents to have different aspiration levels in the imitative protocols where their aspiration levels are not observable to other agents. We show that the distribution of strategies becomes statistically independent of the aspiration level eventually in the long run. Thus, long-run properties of homogeneous imitative dynamics hold as well, despite heterogeneity in aspiration levels.

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KW - Learning

KW - Multiple populations

KW - Wright manifold

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ER -

Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels

Abstract

Keywords

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