@article{d9cb6331969e4c87bfdf2ced297e9caf,
title = "Existence, uniqueness, and comparative statics of Nash equilibrium in a game of voluntary public good provision with two public goods",
abstract = "This paper shows the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in the presence of many heterogeneous players with two public goods under Cobb–Douglas preferences. It provides a sufficient condition for a unique equilibrium including contributors providing both public goods, and shows that contributors providing both public goods appear frequently. This uniqueness property allows us to conduct a comparative statics analysis with a contributor and a free rider of both public goods, showing the role of the contributor providing both public goods.",
keywords = "Nash equilibrium, aggregate games, free riders, two public goods, voluntary provision",
author = "Kenichi Suzuki and Tatsuyoshi Miyakoshi and Itaya, {Jun ichi} and Akitomo Yamanashi",
note = "Funding Information: An early version of this paper was presented at the Japan Society of International Economics Spring Meeting (Nagoya), the Japanese Economic Association Spring Meetings (Sapporo), the Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society (Singapore), and the Operations Research Society of Japan (Osaka). We are grateful to two anonymous referees and participants for their helpful comments and suggestions. The research of the second and third authors was supported by Grants‐in‐Aid 20K01755 and 19K01711, respectively, from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport, Science and Technology of Japan. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.",
year = "2022",
month = may,
doi = "10.1111/meca.12375",
language = "English",
volume = "73",
pages = "567--582",
journal = "Metroeconomica",
issn = "0026-1386",
publisher = "John Wiley and Sons Inc.",
number = "2",
}