TY - GEN
T1 - Information leakage from cryptographic hardware via common-mode current
AU - Hayashi, Yu Ichi
AU - Sugawara, Takeshi
AU - Kayano, Yoshiki
AU - Homma, Naofumi
AU - Mizuki, Takaaki
AU - Satoh, Akashi
AU - Aoki, Takafumi
AU - Minegishi, Shigeki
AU - Sone, Hideaki
AU - Inoue, Hiroshi
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - Recently, it has been known that electromagnetic radiation from electrical device leaks internal information. That is, electromagnetic radiation contains information. Especially, it causes serious problem for cryptographic modules if electromagnetic radiation contains secret information. Therefore many studies have been made on power/electromagnetic analysis attacks, which extract secret keys from cryptographic modules by analyzing waveforms of currents, voltage or electromagnetic field. The attacks assume that the waveforms should contain the information leakage in some way. However, there are few studies discussing about "mechanisms" of the information leakage via electromagnetic field. In this paper, we will give the leakage model caused by common-mode currents, which are one of dominant factors of radiation. If the common-mode currents contain the secret information, it might be possible to obtain the information from far field. In order to verify the leakage model, we implement cryptographic hardware on an FPGA board, and reveal the secret information from common-mode currents measured by using EMC measurement techniques.
AB - Recently, it has been known that electromagnetic radiation from electrical device leaks internal information. That is, electromagnetic radiation contains information. Especially, it causes serious problem for cryptographic modules if electromagnetic radiation contains secret information. Therefore many studies have been made on power/electromagnetic analysis attacks, which extract secret keys from cryptographic modules by analyzing waveforms of currents, voltage or electromagnetic field. The attacks assume that the waveforms should contain the information leakage in some way. However, there are few studies discussing about "mechanisms" of the information leakage via electromagnetic field. In this paper, we will give the leakage model caused by common-mode currents, which are one of dominant factors of radiation. If the common-mode currents contain the secret information, it might be possible to obtain the information from far field. In order to verify the leakage model, we implement cryptographic hardware on an FPGA board, and reveal the secret information from common-mode currents measured by using EMC measurement techniques.
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U2 - 10.1109/ISEMC.2010.5711256
DO - 10.1109/ISEMC.2010.5711256
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:79952388290
SN - 9781424463053
T3 - IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
SP - 109
EP - 114
BT - IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2010 - Final Program
T2 - 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility, EMC 2010
Y2 - 25 July 2010 through 30 July 2010
ER -