TY - GEN
T1 - Intentional electromagnetic interference for fault analysis on AES block cipher IC
AU - Hayashi, Yu-Ichi
AU - Gomisawa, Shigeto
AU - Li, Yang
AU - Homma, Naofumi
AU - Sakiyama, Kazuo
AU - Aoki, Takafumi
AU - Ohta, Kazuo
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - This paper presents a new type of intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) which causes information leakage from cryptographic ICs (Integrated Circuits). As a recent threat, it is known that faults in cryptographic ICs such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) have significant influence on leakage of sensitive information. AES is a block cipher standardized by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology of the United States) that is a de-facto standard of smart card ICs and used for many security devices. In order to guarantee the tamper-resistance of AES hardware, this paper discusses the potential vulnerability against faults induced by IEMI via power cables. The contribution of the paper is twofold. (1) We find that, different from previous work of fault analysis, the electromagnetic (EM) faults from power cables are remotely-controllable and lead to the leakage of the secret key. (2) We show that the random EM faults can be managed with reasonable amount of measurements and its risk to the key leakage is high enough to be a real-life threat.
AB - This paper presents a new type of intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) which causes information leakage from cryptographic ICs (Integrated Circuits). As a recent threat, it is known that faults in cryptographic ICs such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) have significant influence on leakage of sensitive information. AES is a block cipher standardized by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology of the United States) that is a de-facto standard of smart card ICs and used for many security devices. In order to guarantee the tamper-resistance of AES hardware, this paper discusses the potential vulnerability against faults induced by IEMI via power cables. The contribution of the paper is twofold. (1) We find that, different from previous work of fault analysis, the electromagnetic (EM) faults from power cables are remotely-controllable and lead to the leakage of the secret key. (2) We show that the random EM faults can be managed with reasonable amount of measurements and its risk to the key leakage is high enough to be a real-life threat.
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M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84863053336
SN - 9789531841580
T3 - Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Electromagnetic Compatibility of Integrated Circuits 2011, EMC COMPO 2011
SP - 235
EP - 240
BT - Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Electromagnetic Compatibility of Integrated Circuits 2011, EMC COMPO 2011
T2 - 8th International Workshop on Electromagnetic Compatibility of Integrated Circuits, EMC COMPO 2011
Y2 - 6 November 2011 through 9 November 2011
ER -