TY - JOUR
T1 - Is transportation infrastructure cost recoverable under the risk of disasters?
AU - Itoh, Ryo
N1 - Funding Information:
The author expresses his heartfelt gratitude to Se-il Mun, Achim Czeny, Masamitsu Onishi, Oliver Feng Yeu SHYR, Anming Zhang, and participants of the Urban Economic Workshop in Kyoto University, the 4th Asian seminar in Regional Science, the 61st North American Regional Science Council, the ITEA conference in Barcelona for their helpful comments. The author also acknowledges the financial support from JSPS Grant-in-Aid Nos. 24730216 and S16420007 . Appendix A
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Elsevier Ltd
PY - 2018/12
Y1 - 2018/12
N2 - This study examines cost recoverability, or whether or not the expected revenue from the optimal congestion toll exceeds the cost of optimal investment in transportation infrastructure, when its capacity is uncertain owing to significantly large disasters whose loss cannot be hedged, either by any saving or insurance. The government controls the degree of reliability of the entire transportation system by combining two types of infrastructure, namely, unstable infrastructure, whose capacity decreases when a disaster occurs, and stable infrastructure, whose capacity is constant regardless of the occurrence of disaster. Under the assumption of risk-averse preferences of households, the theorem of cost recovery does not hold even if the congestion toll is controlled in a completely flexible manner, given any incidents. The optimally designed unstable (stable) infrastructure is (not) cost recoverable because the benefit of investment mitigating the risk premium in social welfare is not covered by the revenue of the congestion toll. We also show that if the transportation cost is specified by a linear function, The entire transportation infrastructure is not cost recoverable, if price elasticity of transport demand is less than one, as many empirical studies have shown.
AB - This study examines cost recoverability, or whether or not the expected revenue from the optimal congestion toll exceeds the cost of optimal investment in transportation infrastructure, when its capacity is uncertain owing to significantly large disasters whose loss cannot be hedged, either by any saving or insurance. The government controls the degree of reliability of the entire transportation system by combining two types of infrastructure, namely, unstable infrastructure, whose capacity decreases when a disaster occurs, and stable infrastructure, whose capacity is constant regardless of the occurrence of disaster. Under the assumption of risk-averse preferences of households, the theorem of cost recovery does not hold even if the congestion toll is controlled in a completely flexible manner, given any incidents. The optimally designed unstable (stable) infrastructure is (not) cost recoverable because the benefit of investment mitigating the risk premium in social welfare is not covered by the revenue of the congestion toll. We also show that if the transportation cost is specified by a linear function, The entire transportation infrastructure is not cost recoverable, if price elasticity of transport demand is less than one, as many empirical studies have shown.
KW - (Un)stable infrastructure
KW - Cost recovery
KW - Disaster
KW - Risk aversion
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U2 - 10.1016/j.tra.2018.09.014
DO - 10.1016/j.tra.2018.09.014
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85054193432
SN - 0965-8564
VL - 118
SP - 457
EP - 465
JO - Transportation Research, Part A: Policy and Practice
JF - Transportation Research, Part A: Policy and Practice
ER -