TY - JOUR
T1 - Neutrino-based tools for nuclear verification and diplomacy in North Korea
AU - Carr, Rachel
AU - Coleman, Jonathon
AU - Danilov, Mikhail
AU - Gratta, Giorgio
AU - Heeger, Karsten
AU - Huber, Patrick
AU - Hor, Yuen Keung
AU - Kawasaki, Takeo
AU - Kim, Soo Bong
AU - Kim, Yeongduk
AU - Learned, John
AU - Lindner, Manfred
AU - Nakajima, Kyohei
AU - Nikkel, James
AU - Seo, Seon Hee
AU - Suekane, Fumihiko
AU - Vacheret, Antonin
AU - Wang, Wei
AU - Wilhelmi, James
AU - Zhan, Liang
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
PY - 2019/1/2
Y1 - 2019/1/2
N2 - We present neutrino-based options for verifying that the nuclear reactors at North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center are no longer operating or that they are operating in an agreed manner, precluding weapons production. Neutrino detectors may be a mutually agreeable complement to traditional verification protocols because they do not require access inside reactor buildings, could be installed collaboratively, and provide persistent and specific observations. At Yongbyon, neutrino detectors could passively verify reactor shutdowns or monitor power levels and plutonium contents, all from outside the reactor buildings. The monitoring options presented here build on recent successes in basic particle physics. Following a dedicated design study, these tools could be deployed in as little as one year at a reasonable cost. In North Korea, cooperative deployment of neutrino detectors could help redirect a limited number of scientists and engineers from military applications to peaceful technical work in an international community. Opportunities for scientific collaboration with South Korea are especially strong. We encourage policymakers to consider collaborative neutrino projects within a broader program of action toward stability and security on the Korean Peninsula.
AB - We present neutrino-based options for verifying that the nuclear reactors at North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center are no longer operating or that they are operating in an agreed manner, precluding weapons production. Neutrino detectors may be a mutually agreeable complement to traditional verification protocols because they do not require access inside reactor buildings, could be installed collaboratively, and provide persistent and specific observations. At Yongbyon, neutrino detectors could passively verify reactor shutdowns or monitor power levels and plutonium contents, all from outside the reactor buildings. The monitoring options presented here build on recent successes in basic particle physics. Following a dedicated design study, these tools could be deployed in as little as one year at a reasonable cost. In North Korea, cooperative deployment of neutrino detectors could help redirect a limited number of scientists and engineers from military applications to peaceful technical work in an international community. Opportunities for scientific collaboration with South Korea are especially strong. We encourage policymakers to consider collaborative neutrino projects within a broader program of action toward stability and security on the Korean Peninsula.
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U2 - 10.1080/08929882.2019.1603007
DO - 10.1080/08929882.2019.1603007
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85067561206
SN - 0892-9882
VL - 27
SP - 15
EP - 28
JO - Science and Global Security
JF - Science and Global Security
IS - 1
ER -