TY - GEN
T1 - Practical power analysis on KCipher-2 software on low-end microcontrollers
AU - Kawai, Wataru
AU - Ueno, Rei
AU - Homma, Naofumi
AU - Aoki, Takafumi
AU - Fukushima, Kazuhide
AU - Kiyomoto, Shinsaku
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 IEEE.
PY - 2017/6/30
Y1 - 2017/6/30
N2 - In this paper, we present a practical power-analysisbased attack on KCipher-2 software implemented on microcontrollers. The key idea of the proposed attack is to exploit aspecific Hamming weight (HW) leakage from low-end microcontrollers or to skip a specific part of the software sequence by a fault injection on low-end microcontrollers in addition toa conventional power analysis available for KCipher-2 hardware. The efficiency and validity of the proposed method are demonstrated through experiment on KCipher-2 software implemented on 8-bit AVR and 32-bit ARM microcontrollers. The proposed attack can reveal the entire 128-bit key of KCipher-2 within a realistic computation cost, while the conventionalattack does not. In this paper, we also present a compact countermeasure against the proposed attack on the basis of random masking techniques, which can be implemented on aresource-constrained microcontroller.
AB - In this paper, we present a practical power-analysisbased attack on KCipher-2 software implemented on microcontrollers. The key idea of the proposed attack is to exploit aspecific Hamming weight (HW) leakage from low-end microcontrollers or to skip a specific part of the software sequence by a fault injection on low-end microcontrollers in addition toa conventional power analysis available for KCipher-2 hardware. The efficiency and validity of the proposed method are demonstrated through experiment on KCipher-2 software implemented on 8-bit AVR and 32-bit ARM microcontrollers. The proposed attack can reveal the entire 128-bit key of KCipher-2 within a realistic computation cost, while the conventionalattack does not. In this paper, we also present a compact countermeasure against the proposed attack on the basis of random masking techniques, which can be implemented on aresource-constrained microcontroller.
KW - Fault injection attacks
KW - KCipher-2 software
KW - Masking countermeasures
KW - Microcontroller
KW - Side-channel attacks
KW - Smart card
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85027710509&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85027710509&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/EuroSPW.2017.60
DO - 10.1109/EuroSPW.2017.60
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85027710509
T3 - Proceedings - 2nd IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops, EuroS and PW 2017
SP - 113
EP - 121
BT - Proceedings - 2nd IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops, EuroS and PW 2017
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2nd IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops, EuroS and PW 2017
Y2 - 29 April 2017 through 30 April 2017
ER -