TY - GEN
T1 - Side-channel leakage on silicon substrate of CMOS cryptographic chip
AU - Fujimoto, Daisuke
AU - Tanaka, Daichi
AU - Miura, Noriyuki
AU - Nagata, Makoto
AU - Hayashi, Yu Ichi
AU - Homma, Naofumi
AU - Bhasin, Shivam
AU - Danger, Jean Luc
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2014 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - Power supply currents of CMOS digital circuits partly flow through a silicon substrate in their returning (ground) paths. The voltage bounce due to the substrate currents is seen wherever p+ substrate taps on a p-type die and regarded as a substrate noise. An on-chip waveform monitor confirms the side-channel leakage on the silicon substrate from an AES cryptographic module in a 65 nm CMOS demonstrator chip for the first time. The silicon substrate is essentially common to every circuit and inevitably carries the leakage to the observation taps located at the front as well as at the bottom surface of a die, even if the power and ground wires of an AES module are intentionally separated from the other building blocks. Substrate leakage channels may break the hiding of a cryptographic module regarding its location on a die. The physical properties including the distance dependency are experimentally explored.
AB - Power supply currents of CMOS digital circuits partly flow through a silicon substrate in their returning (ground) paths. The voltage bounce due to the substrate currents is seen wherever p+ substrate taps on a p-type die and regarded as a substrate noise. An on-chip waveform monitor confirms the side-channel leakage on the silicon substrate from an AES cryptographic module in a 65 nm CMOS demonstrator chip for the first time. The silicon substrate is essentially common to every circuit and inevitably carries the leakage to the observation taps located at the front as well as at the bottom surface of a die, even if the power and ground wires of an AES module are intentionally separated from the other building blocks. Substrate leakage channels may break the hiding of a cryptographic module regarding its location on a die. The physical properties including the distance dependency are experimentally explored.
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U2 - 10.1109/HST.2014.6855564
DO - 10.1109/HST.2014.6855564
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84905978975
SN - 9781479941148
T3 - Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, HOST 2014
SP - 32
EP - 37
BT - Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, HOST 2014
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, HOST 2014
Y2 - 6 May 2014 through 7 May 2014
ER -