Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note

Rajat Deb; Shinji Ohseto

doi:10.1007/s001990050348

Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note

Rajat Deb, Shinji Ohseto

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	685-689
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	14
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050348
Publication status	Published - 1999 Nov
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Individual rationality
Non-bossiness
Social choice function
Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s001990050348

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abstract = "Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization.",

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AU - Ohseto, Shinji

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AB - Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization.

KW - Individual rationality

KW - Non-bossiness

KW - Social choice function

KW - Strategy-proofness

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Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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