The implications of overlay routing for ISPs' peering strategies

Xun Shao, Go Hasegawa, Yoshiaki Taniguchi, Hirotaka Nakano

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


The Internet is composed of many distinct networks, operated by independent Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The traffic and economic relationships of ISPs are mainly decided by their routing policies. However, in today's Internet, overlay routing, which changes traffic routing at the application layer, is rapidly increasing and this challenges the validity of ISPs' existing agreements. We study here the economic implications of overlay routing for ISPs, using an ISP interconnection business model based on a simple network. We then study the overlay traffic patterns in the network under various conditions. Combining the business model and traffic patterns, we study the ISPs' cost reductions with Bill-and-Keep peering and paid peering. We also discuss the ISPs' incentive to upgrade the network under each peering strategy.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1115-1124
Number of pages10
JournalIEICE Transactions on Information and Systems
Issue number5
Publication statusPublished - 2013 May


  • ISP
  • Nash bargaining solution
  • Overlay routing
  • Peering
  • Routing game


Dive into the research topics of 'The implications of overlay routing for ISPs' peering strategies'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this