Trading mechanisms for bottleneck permits with multiple purchase opportunities

Pengfei Wang, Pengfei Wang, Kentarou Wada, Takashi Akamatsu, Takeshi Nagae

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)


This paper extends the theory of tradable bottleneck permits system to cases with multiple period markets and designs its implementation mechanism. The multiple period markets can achieve more efficient resource allocation than a single period market when users’ valuations of tradable permits change over time. To implement the multiple period trading markets, we propose an evolutionary mechanism that combines a dynamic auction with a capacity control rule that adjusts a number of permits issued for each market. Then, we prove that the proposed mechanism has the following desirable properties: (i) the dynamic auction is strategy-proof within each period and guarantees that the market choice of each user is optimal under a perfect information assumption of users and (ii) the mechanism maximizes the social surplus in a finite number of iterations. Finally, we show that the proposed mechanism may work well even for an incomplete information case.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)414-430
Number of pages17
JournalTransportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Oct


  • Auction mechanism
  • Benders decomposition
  • Capacity control
  • Multiple period markets
  • Tradable bottleneck permits

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Civil and Structural Engineering
  • Automotive Engineering
  • Transportation
  • Computer Science Applications


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