TY - GEN
T1 - Card-Based Protocol Against Actively Revealing Card Attack
AU - Takashima, Ken
AU - Miyahara, Daiki
AU - Mizuki, Takaaki
AU - Sone, Hideaki
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP17K00001 and JP19J21153. We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their fruitful comments.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - In 1989, den Boer presented the first card-based protocol, called the “five-card trick” that securely computes the AND function using a deck of physical cards via a series of actions such as shuffling and turning over cards. This protocol enables a couple to confirm their mutual love without revealing their individual feelings. During such a secure computation protocol, it is important to keep any information about the inputs secret. Almost all existing card-based protocols are secure under the assumption that all players participating in a protocol are semi-honest or covert, i.e., they do not deviate from the protocol if there is a chance that they will be caught when cheating. In this paper, we consider a more malicious attack in which a player as an active adversary can reveal cards illegally without any hesitation. Against such an actively revealing card attack, we define the t-secureness, meaning that no information about the inputs leaks even if at most t cards are revealed illegally. Subsequently, we design a 1-secure AND protocol. Thus, our contribution is the construction of the first formal framework to handle actively revealing card attacks and their countermeasures.
AB - In 1989, den Boer presented the first card-based protocol, called the “five-card trick” that securely computes the AND function using a deck of physical cards via a series of actions such as shuffling and turning over cards. This protocol enables a couple to confirm their mutual love without revealing their individual feelings. During such a secure computation protocol, it is important to keep any information about the inputs secret. Almost all existing card-based protocols are secure under the assumption that all players participating in a protocol are semi-honest or covert, i.e., they do not deviate from the protocol if there is a chance that they will be caught when cheating. In this paper, we consider a more malicious attack in which a player as an active adversary can reveal cards illegally without any hesitation. Against such an actively revealing card attack, we define the t-secureness, meaning that no information about the inputs leaks even if at most t cards are revealed illegally. Subsequently, we design a 1-secure AND protocol. Thus, our contribution is the construction of the first formal framework to handle actively revealing card attacks and their countermeasures.
KW - Active Security
KW - Card-based protocols
KW - Cryptography
KW - Secure multiparty computations
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-34500-6_6
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-34500-6_6
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85076998730
SN - 9783030344993
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 95
EP - 106
BT - Theory and Practice of Natural Computing - 8th International Conference, TPNC 2019, Proceedings
A2 - Martín-Vide, Carlos
A2 - Pond, Geoffrey
A2 - Vega-Rodríguez, Miguel A.
PB - Springer
T2 - 8th International Conference on the Theory and Practice of Natural Computing, TPNC 2019
Y2 - 9 December 2019 through 11 December 2019
ER -